Manipulation via Capacities Revisited by Ehlers, Lars




This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided
matching markets. So¨nmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is non-
manipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities
can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capaci-
ties: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions
can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-II-
manipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manip-
ulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that
the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which
is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our
characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in
these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by
colleges.
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1 Introduction
Matching markets arise in many economic environments. There are two sides of the
market, called students (or workers) and colleges (or hospitals or schools) and students
need to be matched to colleges. Specifically we are interested in many-to-one matching
markets where monetary compensations are fixed, i.e. salaries are prespecified in
each match and colleges can admit one or possibly more students. In a number of
those environments decentralized markets have failed and centralized clearinghouses
(or mechanisms) have emerged. Leading examples are entry-level medical markets
in Great Britain and the United States, college admissions, and school choice in
American municipalities. In those markets the success of a centralized matching
procedure has been proven to depend on the (in)stability of the mechanism. More
precisely, it has been shown that stable mechanisms outperform unstable mechanisms
in centralized matching markets.
This is surprising because any stable mechanism is susceptible to different kinds
of manipulation. In centralized matching markets colleges’ preferences are private in-
formation and need to be reported to the clearinghouse. A mechanism is manipulable
via preferences if a college can gain (in terms of the true preference) by submitting
a false preference instead of its true preference. Roth (1985) showed that any sta-
ble mechanism is manipulable via preferences (for colleges).1 Similarly the colleges’
capacities are private information and a mechanism is manipulable via capacities if
a college can gain (in terms of the true preference) by underreporting its true ca-
pacity. So¨nmez (1997) showed a counterpart of Roth’s result: any stable mechanism
is manipulable via capacities. Our first result links these two types of manipulation
as follows: for any given problem, if a stable mechanism is manipulable via capac-
ities, then this mechanism is manipulable via preferences. Hence, the impossibility
result (for preference manipulation) by Roth (1985) is a direct consequence of the
1Roth (1982) showed that any stable mechanism is manipulable via preferences for colleges or
students.
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impossibility result (for capacity manipulation) by So¨nmez (1997).
Motivated by the impossibility result by So¨nmez (1997), one strand of recent lit-
erature (Konishi and U¨nver, 2006; Kojima, 2006; Romero-Medina and Triossi, 2007)
considered games of capacity manipulation induced by the student-optimal stable
mechanism and the college-optimal stable mechanism. Unfortunately pure strategy
Nash equilibria may not exist (Konishi and U¨nver, 2006). Two other contributions
(Kojima, 2007; Kesten, 2008) determine domains where no college can gain by ma-
nipulation via capacities. More precisely, Kojima (2007) shows that a college with a
fixed preference relation and capacity of at least two can almost always be embedded
in a problem such that the student-optimal stable mechanism or the college-optimal
stable mechanism is manipulable via capacities by this college. Similarly, Kesten
(2008) shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism for a given problem is non-
manipulable via capacities if and only if the problem satisfies a strong “acyclicity”
condition. All these results are disappointing regarding manipulation via capacities
(of the student-optimal stable mechanism and/or the college-optimal stable mecha-
nism).
Here we will not narrow ourselves to the student-optimal stable mechanism or the
college-optimal stable mechanism and not restrict the domain of problems under con-
sideration. We try to understand when and how mechanisms can be manipulated via
capacities. We show that the non-manipulability via capacities of an arbitrary mech-
anism can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities:
(i) non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can ma-
nipulate by dropping some of its empty positions, and (ii) non-Type-II-manipulability
meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some
of its filled positions. We show that a mechanism is non-manipulable via capacities
if and only if the mechanism is both non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and non-
Type-II-manipulable via capacities. Our main result shows that the student-optimal
stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable
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via capacities and independent of truncations. Hence, the student-optimal stable
mechanism is characterized in terms of non-manipulation properties of colleges and
these properties imply that the mechanism is non-manipulable via preferences for
students.
Our main result further supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism
in applications. The NRMP changed the mechanism from the college-optimal stable
mechanism to the student-optimal stable mechanism because of its non-manipulability
via preferences for students. This change did not have only a positive effect on the stu-
dents’ side, but also on the colleges’ side because a limited form of non-manipulability
via capacities is guaranteed. Note that this is not guaranteed by the college-optimal
stable mechanism because it is both Type-I- and Type-II-manipulable via capacities.
Our main result also points out positive effects of the use of the student-optimal sta-
ble mechanism in school choice (like in Boston): here priorities of schools are fixed or
known and a school may only manipulate via capacities. Again under the student-
optimal stable mechanism schools with vacant seats cannot manipulate by dropping
some of their empty seats.
A consequence of our main result is that any stable mechanism is Type-II-manipulable
via capacities. Indeed avoiding manipulability via capacities by colleges with no va-
cant positions is difficult. Of course, any such solution will be unstable. For problems
where each college has exactly one position no college can gain by underreporting
its capacity. We show that one may use an iterative stable mechanism in order to
avoid manipulations via capacities.2 In determining which “no blocking” conditions
an iterative stable mechanism may possess, recall that in school choice stability (of
a matching) is equivalent to non-wastefulness (no empty positions are wasted) and
fairness (no student justifiably envies another student at a college). We adopt weaker
notions of these two “no blocking” conditions and establish in school choice a variant
of the impossibility result by So¨nmez (1997): (a) there exists no mechanism which is
2We provide details later.
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non-wasteful, weakly fair, and non-manipulable via capacities; and (b) there exists no
mechanism which is weakly non-wasteful, fair, and non-manipulable via capacities.
If both “no blocking” conditions are weakened, then a possibility emerges. Namely,
any iterative stable mechanism satisfies weak non-wastefulness, weak fairness and
non-manipulability via capacities. In applications, if non-manipulation via capacities
is more important than stability, then an iterative stable mechanism may provide a
practical solution since it satisfies the weaker versions of the “no blocking” conditions
non-wastefulness and fairness.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the two-sided matching
market, stability and manipulation via capacities. Section 3 provides the direct link
for stable mechanisms between manipulation via capacities and manipulation via
preferences. Section 4 introduces two types of non-manipulation via capacities and
gives our main result: the characterization of the student-optimal mechanism. Section
5 introduces iterative (stable) mechanisms and establishes the variant of So¨nmez
(1997) for school choice.
2 The Model
A college admissions problem is a quadruple (S,C, q, R) where (i) S denotes the
finite set of students, (ii) C denotes the finite set of colleges, (iii) q = (qc)c∈C is list of
natural numbers where qc is the capacity (or the number of available slots at college
c), and (iv) R = (Rv)v∈S∪C is a list of preference relations. Since we consider the case
where S and C remain fixed, we write (q, R) instead of (S,C, q, R). Furthermore,
for any T ⊆ C, let qT = (qc)c∈T and q−T = (qc)c∈C\T , and for any c ∈ C, let
R−c = (Rv)v∈S∪(C\{c}).
For any v ∈ S ∪ C, Rv is a complete and transitive preference relation. Let Pv
denote the strict preference relation associated with Rv. For any s ∈ S, Rs is a strict
preference relation on C ∪ {∅} where ∅ stands for being unmatched. For any c ∈ C,
Rc is a preference relation on 2
S such that Rc is strict on S∪{∅} and Rc is responsive
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over 2S (to Rc|S∪∅3): for all S ′ ⊆ S and all s, s′ ∈ S\S ′,
(i) S ′ ∪ {s}PcS ′ ∪ {s′} ⇔ sPcs′ and (ii) S ′ ∪ {s}PcS ′ ⇔ sPc∅.4
Let Rc denote the set of all responsive preferences over 2S.
Given Rs, college c is acceptable under Rs if cPs∅. Similarly, for any Rc, student s
is acceptable under Rc if sPc∅. Let A(Rc) = {s ∈ S : sPc∅} denote the set of students
who are acceptable under Rc.
A matching for a given capacity vector q is a function µ : S ∪C → 2S∪C such that
(i) for all s ∈ S, |µ(s)| ≤ 1 and µ(s) ⊆ C;
(ii) for all c ∈ C, |µ(c)| ≤ qc and µ(c) ⊆ S; and
(iii) for all s ∈ S and all c ∈ C, µ(s) = c if and only if s ∈ µ(c).
The main concept is stability of a matching: no student should be matched to an
unacceptable college, no college should be matched to any unacceptable student, and
no student-college pair blocks the matching because they mutually prefer each other.
Given a problem (q, R), a matching µ for q is stable if
(a) (individual rationality for students) for all s ∈ S, µ(s)Rs∅;
(b) (individual rationality for colleges) for all c ∈ C, µ(c) ⊆ A(Rc);
(c) (no blocking pair) there exists no s ∈ S and c ∈ C such that cPsµ(s) and either
[|µ(c)| < qc and sPc∅] or [sPcs′ for some s′ ∈ µ(c)].
Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the set of stable matchings is non-empty for any
problem (q, R). Furthermore, the set of stable matchings has a lattice structure and
there exists a stable matching, called the student-optimal stable matching which is
weakly preferred to any other stable matching by the students and which is worst
3Here Rc|S∪∅ denotes the restriction of Rc to S ∪ ∅.
4For convenience, we drop set brackets for singleton sets and write s instead of {s}.
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for the colleges among all stable matchings. Similarly, there exists a college-optimal
stable matching which is weakly preferred to any other stable matching by the colleges.
The student-optimal stable matching can be calculated via the deferred-algorithm
(DA) with students proposing and the college-optimal stable matching via the DA-
algorithm with colleges proposing. Furthermore, at any two stable matchings, any
college fills the same number of positions; and if a college does not fill all its positions
at a stable matching, then this college is matched to the same set of students under
all stable matchings.5
A mechanism (or mechanism) ϕ associates with any problem (q, R) a matching
ϕ(q, R) for the capacity vector q. A mechanism ϕ is stable if for any problem (q, R),
ϕ(q, R) is stable. LetDAS denote student-optimal stable mechanism choosing for each
problem (q, R) its student-optimal stable matching (determined for each problem via
the DA-algorithm with students proposing). Let DAC denote the college-optimal
stable mechanism.
In many situations capacities are private information and a college may attempt
to manipulate a mechanism via underreporting its capacity.
Definition 1 Let R be a profile, q be a capacity vector, and ϕ be a mechanism. Then
ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (q, R) if there exists c ∈ C and q′c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qc}
such that
ϕ(q′c, q−c, R)(c)Pcϕ(q, R)(c).
We say that ϕ is non-manipulable via capacities if for any problem (q, R), ϕ is not
manipulable via capacities at (q, R).
The principal result of So¨nmez (1997) is the following.
Theorem 1 (So¨nmez, 1997, Theorem 1) Suppose there are at least three stu-
dents and two colleges. Then there exists no mechanism that is stable and non-
manipulable via capacities.
5All these properties of stable matchings are stated in the illuminating introduction to two-sided
matching by Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
7
3 Manipulation via Preferences
An important concern of clearinghouses in centralized markets is whether a mecha-
nism can be profitably manipulated via misreporting preferences. If this is the case,
then the outcome of the mechanism may not be based on the true information of the
participants.
Definition 2 Let R be a profile, q be a capacity vector, and ϕ be a mechanism. Then
ϕ is manipulable via preferences at (q, R) if there exists c ∈ C and R′c ∈ Rc such that
ϕ(q, R′c, R−c)(c)Pcϕ(q, R)(c).
We say that ϕ is non-manipulable via preferences if for any problem (q, R), ϕ is not
manipulable via preferences at (q, R).
Note that the above definition focusses only on manipulation via preferences by
colleges. The following establishes for stable mechanisms an important link between
manipulation via capacities and manipulation via preferences.6
Theorem 2 Let ϕ be stable mechanism, q be a capacity vector, and R be a profile.
If ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (q, R), then ϕ is manipulable via preferences at
(q, R).
Proof. If ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (q, R), then there exists some c ∈ C
and q′c ∈ {1, . . . , qc} such that ϕ(q′c, q−c, R)(c)Pcϕ(q, R)(c). Let R′c ∈ Rc be such
that A(R′c) = ϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c). Obviously, ϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R) is stable under (q, R
′
c, R−c).
Since ϕ is stable, c fills the same number of positions under all stable matchings, and
A(R′c) = ϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c), we must have ϕ(q, R
′
c, R−c)(c) = ϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c). Hence,
ϕ(q, R′c, R−c)(c)Pcϕ(q, R)(c) and ϕ is manipulable via preferences at (q, R), the desired
conclusion. 
6This result is related to the “Dropping Strategies Lemma” by Kojima and Pathak (2008).
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Remark 1 By Theorem 1, we know that there exists no stable mechanism that is
non-manipulable via capacities. Thus, for any stable mechanism there exist problems
at which the mechanism is manipulable via capacities. Now by Theorem 2, for any
stable mechanism there exist problems at which the mechanism is manipulable via
preferences. Hence, there exists no stable mechanism that is non-manipulable via
preferences (for colleges) and Roth (1985, Proposition 2) is a corollary from So¨nmez
(1997, Theorem 1).
4 Two Types of Capacity Manipulation
In the sequel we will distinguish between two types of capacity manipulation.
Definition 3 Let q be a capacity vector, R be a profile, and ϕ be a mechanism. For
all c ∈ C, let |ϕ(q, R)(c)| = fc denote the number of filled positions at college c under
ϕ(q, R).
(i) Then ϕ is Type-I-manipulable via capacities at (q, R) if there exists c ∈ C and
q′c ∈ {fc, fc + 1, . . . , qc} such that
ϕ(q′c, q−c, R)(c)Pcϕ(q, R)(c).
We say that ϕ is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities if for any problem (q, R),
ϕ is not Type-I-manipulable via capacities at (q, R).
(ii) Then ϕ is Type-II-manipulable via capacities at (q, R) if there exists c ∈ C with
fc = qc and q
′
c ∈ {1, . . . , fc − 1} such that
ϕ(q′c, q−c, R)(c)Pcϕ(q, R)(c).
We say that ϕ is non-Type-II-manipulable via capacities if for any problem
(q, R), ϕ is not Type-II-manipulable via capacities at (q, R).
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These two types of manipulation via capacities have the following interpretations.
Type-I-manipulability means that a college with vacant positions gains from giving
up some of its unfilled positions. Type-II-manipulability means that a college with
no vacant positions gains from giving up some of its filled positions. Then a college
is ready to forego some of its students (leaving these positions empty) in order to
exchange some of the other students for better students. Of course, a college could si-
multaneously give up some of its filled positions and forego some of its students, giving
rise to a third type of manipulability via capacities. By the lemma below, such a third
type of non-manipulability is unnecessary for determining the non-manipulability via
capacities of a mechanism.
Lemma 1 Let ϕ be a mechanism. Then ϕ is non-manipulable via capacities if and
only if ϕ is both non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and non-Type-II-manipulable
via capacities.
Proof. (Only if) It is straightforward that if ϕ is non-manipulable via capacities,
then ϕ is both non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and non-Type-II-manipulable
via capacities.
(If) Suppose that ϕ is both non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and non-Type-
II-manipulable via capacities. Let q be a capacity vector and R be a profile. Let q′c ∈
{1, . . . , qc}. Now if |ϕ(q, R)(c)| = qc, then from non-Type-II-manipulability we obtain
ϕ(q, R)(c)Rcϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c); and if |ϕ(q, R)(c)| < qc and |ϕ(q, R)(c)| ≤ q′c, then from
non-Type-I-manipulability we obtain ϕ(q, R)(c)Rcϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c). Otherwise, if both
|ϕ(q, R)(c)| < qc and q′c < |ϕ(q, R)(c)| = fc, then from non-Type-I-manipulability we
obtain
ϕ(q, R)(c)Rcϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c). (1)
Now if |ϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c)| = fc, then from non-Type-II-manipulability we obtain that
ϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c)Rcϕ(q′c, q−c, R)(c). By transitivity ofRc and (1), ϕ(q, R)(c)Rcϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c),
the desired conclusion. If both |ϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c)| < fc and |ϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c)| ≤ q′c, then
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from non-Type-I-manipulability we obtain ϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c)Rcϕ(q′c, q−c, R)(c). Thus,
by transitivity of Rc and (1), ϕ(q, R)(c)Rcϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c), the desired conclusion. If
both |ϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c)| < fc and q′c < |ϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c)| = f ′c, then from non-Type-I-
manipulability we obtain
ϕ(fc, q−c, R)(c)Rcϕ(f ′c, q−c, R)(c).
By using similar arguments and the transitivity of Rc, this and (1) yield in a finite
number of steps (since qc is finite) ϕ(q, R)(c)Rcϕ(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c), the desired conclu-
sion. 
Before stating the main result, we introduce an invariance property for a mech-
anism: it says that for any given problem, if a college truncates its preference by
leaving unchanged its ranking over students and restricting its set of acceptable stu-
dents without dropping any of the students it is matched to, then for the problem with
the truncated preference the college should be matched to the same set of students.
Let Rc, R
′
c ∈ Rc. Then we call R′c a truncation of Rc if (i) R′c|S = Rc|S and
A(R′c) ⊆ A(Rc) and (ii) for all S ′, S ′′ ⊆ A(R′c), we have S ′R′cS ′′ ⇔ S ′RcS ′′.
We say that a mechanism ϕ is independent of truncations if for any problem (q, R),
for any c ∈ C, and for any truncation R′c of Rc such that ϕ(q, R)(c) ⊆ A(R′c), we have
ϕ(q, R′c, R−c)(c) = ϕ(q, R)(c).
Independence of truncations is a weak invariance property which is satisfied by
many stable mechanisms: DAS and DAC , or strictly order all matchings according to
> and choose for any problem (q, R) the >-greatest matching which is stable under
(q, R). Furthermore, as Ehlers (2008) shows, all mechanisms which are used in British
entry-level medical markets satisfy this property.7
The result below characterizes DAS in terms of stability and axioms of non-
manipulability for colleges. Furthermore, the properties of stability, independence of
7According to the author’s knowledge, any mechanism, which is used in a real life market, satisfies
this property.
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truncations and non-Type-I-manipulability via capacities imply that the mechanism
is non-manipulable via preferences for students since the student-optimal mechanism
DAS satisfies this property (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982).
Theorem 3 The student-optimal stable mechanism DAS is the unique stable mecha-
nism which is independent of truncations and non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities.
Proof. First, we show that DAS is a stable mechanism which is independent of
truncations and non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities. By definition, DAS is stable
and by Ehlers (2008), independent of truncations. In order to show that DAS is
non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities, let q be a capacity vector and R be a profile.
Let q′c ∈ {|DAS(q, R)(c)|, |DAS(q, R)(c)|+ 1, . . . , qc}. Obviously, DAS(q, R) is stable
under (q′c, q−c, R). Since DAS(q
′
c, q−c, R) is the worst stable matching for the colleges,
it follows DAS(q, R)(c)RcDAS(q
′
c, q−c, R)(c), the desired conclusion.
Second, let ϕ be a stable mechanism which is independent of truncations and non-
Type-I-manipulable via capacities. Suppose that ϕ 6= DAS. Then for some problem
(q, R) and some c ∈ C we have ϕ(q, R)(c) 6= DAS(q, R)(c). Since both ϕ(q, R)
and DAS(q, R) are stable and ϕ(q, R)(c) 6= DAS(q, R)(c), college c must fill all its
positions at all stable matchings, i.e. |DAS(q, R)(c)| = qc. Since ϕ(q, R) is stable and
DAS(q, R) is the stable matching which is worst for the colleges, we obtain
ϕ(q, R)(c)PcDAS(q, R)(c). (2)
Let s′ be the Rc-worst student in DAS(q, R)(c) and R′c be a truncation of Rc such that
s′ is the R′c-worst acceptable student. Note that R
′
c|S = Rc|S. Let R′ = (R′c, R−c).
Since both ϕ and DAS are independent of truncations, we obtain both ϕ(q, R
′) =
ϕ(q, R) and DAS(q, R
′) = DAS(q, R). Thus, by (2),
ϕ(q, R′)(c)PcDAS(q, R′)(c). (3)
Consider the problem (qc + 1, q−c, R′). We show that DAS(q, R′) is stable under
(qc+1, q−c, R′): if not, then some pair (sˆ, cˆ) blocks DAS(q, R′) under (qc+1, q−c, R′);
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obviously then we must have cˆ = c and sˆP ′c∅. Since s′ is the R′c-worst accept-
able student, we must have sˆP ′cs
′, which means that DAS(q, R′) is not stable under
(q, R′), a contradiction. Since DAS(q, R′) is stable under (qc + 1, q−c, R′) and and
|DAS(q, R′)(c)| = qc < qc + 1, c is matched to the same set of students at all match-
ings which are stable under (qc + 1, q−c, R′). Thus, by stability of ϕ, we have ϕ(qc +
1, q−c, R′)(c) = DAS(q, R′)(c). Now by (3), we obtain ϕ(q, R′)(c)Pcϕ(qc+1, q−c, R′)(c).
Since |ϕ(qc + 1, q−c, R′)(c)| = qc, this means that ϕ is Type-I-manipulable via capac-
ities, a contradiction. 
Note that in Theorem 3 non-Type-I-manipulability via capacities is a weak con-
dition because it requires only that colleges with vacant positions cannot profitably
manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions.
The independence of the properties in Theorem 3 is easily established: (i) DAC
is a stable mechanism which is independent of truncations (but DAC violates non-
Type-I-manipulability via capacities); (ii) the mechanism leaving for all problems all
students unmatched and all colleges having all positions empty is independent of
truncations and non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities (but violates stability); and
(iii) the mechanism choosing for all problems the same matching as DAS except for
the problems (q, R) where qc = 1 for all c ∈ C, all students are acceptable for all
colleges (i.e. A(Rc) = S for all c ∈ C), all colleges are acceptable for all students
(i.e. cPs∅ for all s ∈ S and all c ∈ C), and there are more students than colleges
(i.e. |S| > |C|)). For those problems the mechanism chooses the college-optimal
stable matching. It is straightforward to verify that this mechanism is stable and
non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities but violates independence of truncations.
Remark 2 The feature of the statement of Theorem 3 that optimal stable mecha-
nism for the students, DAS, is characterized in terms of non-manipulation properties
of the other side (by colleges) has appeared in iterative elimination of dominated
strategies. More precisely, for one-to-one matching markets Alcalde (1996) showed
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that the student-optimal mechanism is dominance solvable and for any problem it
uniquely implements (in terms of dominance solvability) the college-optimal stable
matching.
By Theorem 3,DAS is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities. Now from Theorem
1 by So¨nmez (1997) we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4 Suppose there are at least three students and at least two colleges. Then
there exists no mechanism that is stable and non-Type-II-manipulable via capacities.
Theorem 4 points out why manipulation via capacities is problematic: colleges
with no vacant positions may gain from manipulation.
5 Iterative Mechanisms
We know that any stable mechanism is susceptible to (Type-II-)manipulations via
capacities. Colleges may underreport their capacities and fewer positions (than the
true numbers) may be revealed which may result in more unmatched students. In
applications it may be important to deter such manipulations in order to avoid un-
employment (in entry-level labor markets) or unassigned students not attending any
college (in education).
We will propose an iterative procedure which will be non-manipulable via capac-
ities. We call (q, R) a base problem if for all c ∈ C, qc ∈ {0, 1}. A base mechanism
φ associates with any base problem a matching. Below we provide a heuristic way to
extend any base mechanism from the set of base problems to the set of all problems
such that non-manipulability via capacities is guaranteed.
For any set C ′ ⊆ C, let 1C′ denote the vector of capacities such that all colleges
in C ′ have capacity 1 and all other colleges have capacity 0. Let qmax = maxc∈C qc be
the maximal capacity in q.
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Iterative φ-Mechanism: Let (q, R) be a problem. For any natural number l, let
Cl = {c ∈ C : qc ≥ l} and Sl = ∪c∈Cφ(1Cl , R−(S1∪···∪Sl−1))(c) (with the convention
S0 = ∅). The iterative φ-mechanism, denoted by I(φ), is defined as follows. For all
c ∈ C, let
I(φ)(q, R)(c) = ∪qmaxl=1 φ(1Cl , R−(S1∪···∪Sl−1))(c).
In other words, I(φ) gives first each college capacity 1 and calculates φ(1C1 , R). Then
all assigned students are removed and it determines the colleges which have at least
capacity 2 and gives all those ones again capacity 1 and determines again φ for the
reduced problem, and so on. Each college is assigned to the union of all the students
it is matched to at all steps in the iterative φ-mechanism.
Examples of iterative mechanisms are I(DAS) and I(DAC), or iterative Boston
mechanism, iterative priority mechanisms, iterative top-trading cycles algorithm,
etc..8 An iterative stable mechanism is an iterative mechanism where the base mech-
anism chooses for any base problem a stable matching.
It turns out that any iterative mechanism is (coalitionally) non-manipulable via
capacities.
Definition 4 Let R be a profile, q be a capacity vector, and ϕ be a mechanism.
We say that ϕ is coalitionally manipulable via capacities at (q, R) if there exists
∅ 6= T ⊆ C and q′T = (q′c)c∈T with q′c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qc} for any c ∈ T , such that
ϕ(q′T , q−T , R)(c)Pcϕ(q, R)(c) for all c ∈ T . We say that ϕ is coalitionally non-
manipulable via capacities if for any problem (q, R), ϕ is not coalitionally non-manipulable
via capacities at (q, R).
Proposition 1 Let φ be a base mechanism. The iterative φ-mechanism I(φ) is coali-
tionally non-manipulable via capacities.
Proof. Let (q, R) be a problem, ∅ 6= T ⊆ C and q′T = (q′c)c∈T be a capac-
ity vector such that q′c ≤ qc for all c ∈ T . Suppose that for all c ∈ T we have
8We refer the interested reader to Ehlers (2008) and Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) for a
detailed description of these mechanisms.
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I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c)PcI(φ)(q, R)(c). Let q
′ = (q′T , q−T ), C
′
l = {c ∈ C : q′c ≥ l}, and
S ′l = ∪c∈Cφ(1C′l , R−(S′1∪···S′l−1))(c).
First, suppose that for some c ∈ T , we have I(φ)(q, R)(c)\I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c) 6= ∅.
Choose the minimal index k ∈ {1, . . . , qmax} such that for some c′ ∈ T we have
φ(1Ck , R−(S1∪···Sk−1))(c
′) /∈ I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c′). Suppose that T ⊆ C ′k. Then from the
fact that N\T did not change their capacities, by our choice of k and T ⊆ C ′k,
we have for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, 1Cl = 1C′l , Sl = S ′l, φ(1Cl , R−(S1∪···Sl−1)) =
φ(1C′l , R−(S1∪···Sl−1)), and φ(1Cl , R−(S1∪···Sl−1))(c) ∈ I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R−(S1∪···Sl−1))(c) for
all c ∈ C. By T ⊆ C ′k, we then have 1Ck = 1C′k and φ(1Ck , R−(S1∪···Sk−1)) =
φ(1C′k , R−(S1∪···Sk−1)), which contradicts the fact φ(1Ck , R−(S1∪···Sk−1))(c
′) /∈ I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R).
If T ( C ′k, then there exists c ∈ T such that q′c < k. By our choice of k and
I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c)PcI(φ)(q, R)(c), we have I(φ)(q, R)(c) ( I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c). Then
the argument below can be used to show that this case cannot occur.
For all c ∈ T , let I(φ)(q, R)(c) ⊆ I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c). If I(φ) were coalitionally
manipulable at (q, R), then for all c ∈ T we have I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c)PcI(φ)(q, R)(c)
and I(φ)(q, R)(c) ( I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c). Now for all c ∈ T we have
|I(φ)(q, R)(c)| < q′c ≤ qc. (4)
Choose c′ ∈ T such that q′c′ = k ≤ q′c for all c ∈ T . Then from the fact that N\T
did not change their capacities and by our choice of c′ and q′c′ = k, we have for
all l ∈ {1, . . . , |I(φ)(q, R)(c′)|}, 1Cl = 1C′l , Sl = S ′l, and φ(1Cl , R−(S1∪···Sl−1))(c) =
φ(1C′l , R−(S1∪···Sl−1))(c). By (4) and our choice of c
′ and k, we obtain that for all
l ∈ {|I(φ)(q, R)(c′)| + 1, . . . , q′c′}, 1Cl = 1C′l , Sl = S ′l, and φ(1Cl , R−(S1∪···Sl−1)) =
φ(1C′l , R−(S1∪···Sl−1)). Thus, I(φ)(q, R)(c
′) = I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c
′), a contradiction to
I(φ)(q, R)(c′) ( I(φ)(q′T , q−T , R)(c′).
Hence, I(φ) is not coalitionally manipulable via capacities at (q, R), the desired
conclusion. 
Remark 3 A weaker form of coalitional manipulation via capacities is where in Def-
inition 4 we have ϕ(q′T , q−T , R)(c)Rcϕ(q, R)(c) for all c ∈ T with strict preference
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holding for at least one c ∈ T . We say that ϕ strongly coalitionally non-manipulable
via capacities if for any problem, there is no weaker form of coalitional manipula-
tion via capacities. It can be checked that the iterative DAS-mechanism I(DAS)
is strongly coalitionally non-manipulable via capacities9 whereas the iterative DAC-
mechanism I(DAC) does not satisfy this property.
Now one may wonder which properties may be inherited by the iterative φ-
mechanism from the base mechanism φ. Recall that in school choice stability is
divided into two “no blocking” properties: non-wastefulness and fairness. We will
be interested whether iterative mechanism can satisfy any kind of these two “no
blocking” conditions.
Non-wastefulness means that there is no student-college pair (s, c) such that s
prefers c to her current assignment and c has a vacant position which it prefers to fill
with s instead of having the position empty.
Non-Wastefulness: For all problems (q, R), there exists no student-college pair
(s, c) such that cPsϕ(q, R)(s), |ϕ(q, R)(c)| < qc, and sPc∅.
Fairness means that there is no student-college pair (s, c) such that s prefers c to
her current assignment and c prefers s to one of its assigned students.
Fairness: For any problem (q, R), there exists no student-college pair (s, c) such that
cPsϕ(q, R)(s) and sPcs
′ for some s′ ∈ ϕ(q, R)(c).
We also introduce weaker notions of these two “no blocking” conditions. Weak
fairness requires that no student-college pair mutually prefers each other to the match-
9The proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 1 and uses in the second part the fact that for
any C ′ ( C ′′ ⊆ C and any profile R, if DAS(1C′′ , R)(c) = ∅ for all c ∈ C ′′\C ′, then DAS(1C′ , R) =
DAS(1C′′ , R).
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ing such that the college strictly prefers the student to all its assigned students.
Weak Fairness: For all (q, R), there exists no student-college pair (s, c) such that
cPsϕ(q, R)(s) and sPcs
′ for all s′ ∈ ϕ(q, R)(c).
A weaker notion of non-wastefulness is the following: there is no student-college
pair (s, c) such that both s is unmatched and s prefers c to her current assignment
and c has a vacant position which it prefers to fill with s instead of having the position
empty.
Weak Non-Wastefulness: For all problems (q, R), there exists no student-college
pair (s, c) such that ϕ(q, R)(s) = ∅, cPsϕ(q, R)(c), |ϕ(q, R)(c)| < qc, and sPc∅.
For school choice we establish the following variant of So¨nmez’s impossibility result
for college admissions.
Theorem 5 Suppose there are at least four students and at least two colleges. Then
(a) there exists no mechanism that is non-wasteful, weakly fair, and non-manipulable
via capacities; and
(b) there exists no mechanism that is weakly non-wasteful, fair and non-manipulable
via capacities.
Proof. We prove both (a) and (b) via the same example. Consider the following
problem: let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, C = {c1, c2}, and R be a profile such that Rs1 :
c1c2∅10, Rs2 : c2c1∅, Rs3 : c1c2∅, Rs4 : c1c2∅, both Rc1 : s2s3s1s4∅ and s2Pc1{s1, s3, s4},




 and µ′ =
 c1 c2
{s1, s3, s4} s2
 .
10This means c1Ps1c2Ps1∅.
11If a student is not indicated in the matching, then the student is unmatched under this matching.
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First, we show (a). Suppose to the contrary that there exists a mechanism ϕ
satisfying the properties of (a) in Theorem 5. By weak fairness of ϕ (which implies
fairness for base problems) and non-wastefulness, we have ϕ(1, 1, R) = µ. By non-
wastefulness, ϕ(4, 1, R) = µ′. Now by s2Pc1{s1, s3, s4}, ϕ(1, 1, R)(c1)Pc1ϕ(4, 1, R)(c1),
which means that ϕ is manipulable via capacities at (4, 1, R), a contradiction.
Second, we show (b). Suppose to the contrary that there exists a mechanism ϕ
satisfying the properties of (b) in Theorem 5. By fairness and weak non-wastefulness
we have ϕ(1, 1, R) = µ. Consider the problem (3, 1, R). By weak non-wastefulness
and our construction, for all s ∈ S, ϕ(3, 1, R)(s) 6= s. Now if ϕ(3, 1, R)(s4) = c2, then
c2Ps2ϕ(3, 1, R)(s2) and s2Pc2s4, which means that ϕ violates fairness, a contradiction.
Thus, ϕ(3, 1, R)(s4) = c1. Similarly, it follows that ϕ(3, 1, R)(s3) = c1.
Now from s4 ∈ ϕ(3, 1, R)(c1), s1Pc1s4, s1Pc1s4 and fairness we obtain ϕ(3, 1, R) =
µ′. By s2Pc1{s1, s3, s4}, we have ϕ(1, 1, R)(c1)Pc1ϕ(3, 1, R)(c1), which means that ϕ
is manipulable via capacities at (3, 1, R), a contradiction. 
Since stability implies (weak) non-wastefulness and (weak) fairness, Theorem 1
follows from Theorem 5 (when there are more than four students). Reformulated
for school choice, So¨nmez (1997, Theorem 1) shows that there exists no mechanism
which is non-wasteful, fair, and non-manipulable via capacities. Weakening either
non-wastefulness or fairness as above still results in an impossibility regarding non-
manipulability via capacities.
When both “no blocking” properties are weakened, a possibility emerges.
Proposition 2 Let φ be a stable base mechanism. Then the iterative φ-mechanism
I(φ) is weakly non-wasteful, weakly fair, and non-manipulable via capacities.
Proof. By Proposition 1, I(φ) is non-manipulable via capacities. Let (q, R) be a
problem.
In showing weak non-wastefulness, suppose that there exists (s, c) such that
I(φ)(q, R)(s) = ∅, cPsI(φ)(q, R)(s), |I(φ)(q, R)(c)| < qc, and sPc∅. But then for all
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l ∈ {1, . . . , qmax}, s /∈ Sl, and for some k ∈ {1, . . . , qc}, φ(1Ck , R−(S1∪···∪Sk−1))(c) = ∅.
This means that φ(1Ck , R−(S1∪···∪Sk−1)) is not stable because cPs∅, sPc∅, and s /∈
S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk−1. Thus, φ is not a stable base mechanism, a contradiction.
In showing weak fairness, suppose that there exists (s, c) such that cPsI(φ)(q, R)(s)
and s′Pcs for all s′ ∈ I(φ)(q, R)(c). Since φ is stable for base problems, we have
φ(1C1 , R)(c) 6= ∅. Let s′ = φ(1C1 , R)(c). But then by stability of φ(1C1 , R) and s′ 6= s,
s′Pcs, a contradiction. 
In applications, if non-manipulation via capacities is more important than sta-
bility, then an iterative stable mechanism may provide a practical solution since it
satisfies the weaker versions of the two “no blocking” conditions non-wastefulness
and fairness. If stability is more important than non-manipulation via capacities,
then the student-optimal stable mechanism is a good solution because of its limited
manipulability via capacities.
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